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The role of international commodity exchanges in the formation and 
transmission of prices and price risk along international coffee chains 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The collapse of Bretton Woods and the abandonment of fixed exchange rates 
signalled the start of profound changes in the patterns of accumulation. One important 
result of those changes has been the increase in avenues for appropriation in the 
financial sector (Strange 1997; Epstein 2005; Stockhammer 2007). These new 
avenues arose as market actors faced new risks, in the first instance, those associated 
with floating exchange rates. New instruments, such as currency and interest rate 
futures, options and swaps, arose to redress these new risks. Hedging on derivatives 
markets became an imperative for all actors engaged in the trading of foreign 
currencies. The growth of derivatives markets also provided new opportunities for 
speculation and the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. These financial practices 
have become widespread in other areas of the market economy, including stock 
exchanges as well as commodity exchanges located in the US and Europe.1 Increases 
in financial interests on commodity exchanges have lead a number of commentators 
to question the extent to which market characteristics, such as price volatility, have 
changed as a result, with many arguing that speculative flows in commodity markets 
have heightened volatility and are increasingly driving prices in the short and medium 
term. (Domanski and Heath 2007; Doyle, Hill et al. 2007; Brewster 2008) 
 
At the same time, policy thinking around the management of commodity price 
instability shifted dramatically from an emphasis on the avoidance of excessive price 
fluctuations and also export earnings of commodities to one of private market based 
                                                 
1
 Until the 1970s, futures exchanges were separated along the lines of different underlying assets. Until 
1969 the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was exclusively a grain exchange, when it began trade in its 
first non-grain product, with a Silver futures contract. In 1975, CBOT launched its first interest rate 
futures contract, marking a break from trading exclusively in commodities. Today, the CBOT offers 13 
agricultural products, 16 financial products and 4 metal commodity products for exchange. The London 
Stock Exchange, which first opened in 1698, has added a large number of commodity products in its 
list in recent years, 5 in 2004. Today, 31 single commodities and commodity indices based on futures 
prices in the energy, metals and agricultural markets are traded on the exchange, along with products 
based on bonds, covered warrants, exchanged funds, global depositary receipts, ordinary shared and 
structured products.  
The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) was originally set up in 
1982 as a financial futures and options exchange. In 1992 it merged with the London Traded Options 
Market (LTOM) and a further merger with the London Commodity Exchange (LCE) took place in 
1996. A diverse range of financial instruments relating to short term interest rates (STIRs), bonds, 
swaps, equities and commodities are currently traded on LIFFE. 
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risk management strategies. Policy thinking before the 1980s was exemplified in the 
International Commodity Agreements for the maintenance of minimum prices, as well 
as the Compensatory Finance Facility of the IMF and the STABEX scheme of the EC  
that were put in place to ameliorate the adverse effects of commodity export 
instability.  Political and economic factors culminated in the collapse of the ICAs, 
none of which survived the 1980s.  
 
From the mid-1980s, a large literature emerged from academic, policy and 
international institutions criticising ‘traditional’ multilateral policies (Morgan, Rayner 
et al. 1994; Gilbert 1996; Akiyama, Baffes et al. 2003). It was argued that supply 
control and monopoly marketing through state marketing boards were both expensive 
and detrimental to economic efficiency since their operations dampened the supply 
responses of producers to price changes. The 1990s thus saw the, dismantling of 
marketing boards and the liberalisation of commodity markets in LDCs together with 
a push by the various international development organisations towards a private 
market based price risk management (PRM) approach based upon the use of hedging 
instruments by individual or groups of producers and marketing actors.2 Such a policy, 
however, fails to place enough weight on the barriers that individual actors face in 
accessing hedging instruments, particularly in LDCs, owing to the financial, 
information, technical requirements of these PRM strategies. The formulation of these 
policies have also neglected to consider the role of alternative private risk 
management strategies that are often adopted by individual chain actors and the 
implications of these on the price risk environment that is experienced by chain actors 
upstream. In addition, the advocates for the wholesale use of hedging instruments fail 
to consider the realities on the markets on which these instruments are traded, for 
example how the composition of traders can impact upon price behaviour, nor do they 
consider the evolution of the relationship between derivatives markets and the 
commodity chains, along which the physical commodity is processed and distributed, 
that is, how changes in price behaviour on derivatives exchanges are manifested along 
commodity chains. 
 
                                                 
2
 In particular, the World Bank have been at the forefront of this shift in policy focus targeted through 
their International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management (ITFCRM), 
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This neglect to consider the role of derivatives market participants or phenomenon 
that take place at the interface of derivatives and physical markets in part results from 
the assumptions of orthodox financial economics, where all trading activities on 
derivatives markets are seen as stabilising. Similarly, there is an absence of literature 
on the relationship between derivatives and physical markets for commodities, since 
derivatives markets enhance the efficiency of physical markets in their role of 
completing markets along the lines of Arrow and Debreu. (Arrow and Debreu 1954) 
 
This paper attempts to address the decoupling in the literature on the financial and real 
economies by examining some of the interactions between derivatives and physical 
markets for coffee. We look specifically at the role played by international 
commodity exchanges, on which derivatives contracts are traded, in price formation 
and price risk management, and the implications this has on market structure and 
income distribution along specific coffee chains.3 The main questions to be addressed 
in this paper are: How are short-run price variations transmitted along the commodity 
chain? How does this depend upon the structure of the marketing system, the types of 
market actors and the types of risk management strategies that are employed? What 
implications does this transmission of risk have on the structure of the chain, income 
distribution and sustainability? 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: first we will provide a brief 
discussion on the analytical separation within the economic literature on commodities 
between the spheres of enquiry into financial and physical markets; second, we 
suggest how the concept of financialisation may be applied in order to address this 
decoupling in the literature; section 4 gives a brief overview of the historical 
development of international commodity exchanges and some of the recent changes in 
the composition of participants on international commodity exchanges in general, 
with specific figures for the changes in the composition of trading activities on the 
                                                 
3
 Another way of addressing this issue of decoupling is to analyse the relationship between price 
behaviour on physical markets and the types of trading activities taking place on derivatives exchanges. 
While we posit the relationship between speculation and price behaviour, this is not the main focus of 
the analysis in this paper. A quantitative study, by the present author, on the role of speculation by 
financial investors on commodities exchanges on price behaviour can be found as a working paper 
entitled “Changes in the structure of trading on international commodity exchanges and their 
implications on price behaviour: The cases of coffee and cotton” on the website for the Swiss based 
research programme NCCR-trade -  url to be confirmed. 
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coffee exchange of the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) presented. In section 5, 
we illustrate the role played by international commodity exchanges in price formation, 
price risk management and how this could influence the structure and distribution 
along specific coffee chains in Tanzania and Uganda. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Decoupling in the literature between financial and physical markets 
 
Mainstream commodity market theory refers to the “theory of intertemporal price 
formation on speculative markets” (Ghosh, Gilbert et al. 1987).4 The theory focuses 
on the intertemporal relationships between quantity, and consequently price. As well 
as the relationships between market demand (for consumption) and supply, stock may 
be demanded for transactions; precautionary or speculative purposes. Taken together, 
these relationships define an intertemporal stock equilibrium. Movements in 
stockholding imply movements in prices. Prices are however, ultimately determined 
through the mechanisms of supply and demand. Market structure is understood as the 
relationship between the forces of supply and demand. On these basic tenets, 
econometric models of commodity markets are generally constructed to consist of a 
“demand block”, a “supply block”, together with an equation relating stocks and 
prices over time (Labys 1978; Akiyama and Duncan 1982). 
 
Owing to the analytical separation in the mainstream economic literature between the 
spheres of enquiry into finance and production, recent economic approaches to the 
study of commodity markets have failed to account for changes in the nature of how 
incomes are derived by various actors in the commodity system. The neoclassical 
supply and demand analysis necessarily omits the possibility of derivative market 
actors shaping the structure of physical commodity chains. The power structure of 
these markets, the large incomes that can be derived from participation in derivatives 
markets that are contingent on the firm’s financial muscle has driven the increase in 
concentration of market actors at the trader level in tropical agro-commodity markets. 
Despite the reduction of formalised vertical integration in these markets, the high 
                                                 
4
 At the heart of this approach is the definition of primary commodities as goods which simultaneously 
exhibit three defining features. Firstly, commodities are assumed to be readily storable. Second, 
commodities have a high degree of homogeneity, and related to this, commodity markets exhibit high 
degrees of competition. Such a definition distinguishes primary commodities from industrial goods 
characterised by high degrees of product differentiation, high opportunity costs of storage and 
oligopolistic market structures. (Ghosh, Gilbert et. al. 1987)) 
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concentration of multinational trading companies has implications which are at odds 
with the neoclassical ideal of perfect competition.  
 
Studies of derivatives markets have taken place separately from considerations of 
physical markets owing to the implicit assumption of derivatives markets functioning 
to complete markets in the Arrow-Debreu sense (Arrow and Debreu 1954). Economic 
studies on derivatives markets have, by in large, been limited to the sub-discipline of 
financial economics that focuses on the examination of the statistical properties of 
prices on derivatives markets, as well as their statistical relationships with the prices 
of the underlying assets. 
 
By contrast to the mainstream economic literature, commodity chain approaches to 
the study of commodities have placed issues of power of chain actors at the centre of 
their analyses of the structure and functioning of commodity markets, in particular in 
terms of the distribution of surplus along commodity chains that result (Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz 1994; Kaplinsky and Fitter 2001; Fold 2002; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). 
The strength of the various chain approaches to the study of contemporary commodity 
markets lies in their focus on endogenous explanations for changes in the functioning 
of chains, offering the potential for dealing with the political economy. There has, 
however, been a tendency of these approaches to neglect the relationship between 
commodity chains and their wider economic context as well as inter-chain 
relationships. In failing to consider the role of finance and financial markets, first of 
all, in shaping the structure and functioning of physical chains and secondly as a 
bridge, and coordinating mechanism, across chains, chain analyses have neglected to 
consider the role played by powerful agents (from within as well as outside the chain) 
in seeking out profits from their participation on commodity derivatives markets.   
 
3. Recoupling: An analystical framework for investigating the relationship
 between financial and phsyical markets for commodities. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the analytical separation of the spheres of 
finance and the real economy have arisen owing to the assumptions of mainstream 
economics as well as the limited scope of alternative approaches to the study of 
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commodities. This decoupling in the literature has resulted in scarcity of research 
concerning phenomenon that occur at the interface of financial and physical markets.  
 
Financialisation is a relatively new concept that can help us to shed light on the 
relationship between derivatives and physical markets and the consequences of this 
relationship on the accumulation processes of heterogeneous market actors. The 
definition of financialisation, as well as its importance in the contemporary capitalist 
system is much debated. (Epstein 2005; Foster 2007) Broadly, scholars studying the 
process of financialisation are interested in the character of financial expansion in 
penetrating multiple sectors of the economy that had previously been left relatively 
untouched by financial activities. Epstein describes financialisation in its broadest 
sense as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors 
and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies” (Epstein 2005, p3). Other, more operational, definitions of 
financialisation include taking financialisation to entail “the Rise of the Financial or 
Portfolio Conception of the NFC (non-financial Corporations) in Financial Markets” 
(Crotty 2003, p273); “the increasing activity of non-financial business on financial 
markets” (Stockhammer 2004, p270); and “the rise of incomes from financial 
investment” (Stockhammer 2004, p270). 
 
In the context of agricultural markets, the character and consequences of changes in 
the relationship between derivatives and physical markets can be examined using the 
concept of financialisation, as defined above, firstly, by looking at the changes in 
activities on commodity exchanges purely for speculative purposes in order to derive 
incomes from financial investment as opposed to hedging. Similarly, we can look at 
changes in the activities of commodity chain actors on derivatives exchanges. Thirdly, 
it is possible to investigate the implications of the changes in the volume and 
character of trading on international commodities exchanges on the structure of 
physical commodity chains by examining the price risk management and price 
transmission outcomes for heterogeneous chain actors with differentiated abilities to 
access hedging instruments. It is this third aspect that is the subject of the present 
paper. 
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4. The evolution of trading on international commodity exchanges  
 
Futures contracts were developed in the context of trade in agricultural commodities 
as an exchange traded risk management instrument for physical market traders. As an 
agreement between two parties to buy or sell an asset (in this case some quantity of 
the commodity) at a certain time in the future at a certain price. This allows the buyer 
and seller to lock in a price and thus hedge against risks associated with adverse 
movements in price that might take place between harvest and delivery. 
 
The trading of futures contracts can be traced back to Japan in the 18th Century for 
rice and silk, and the Netherlands for tulip bulbs.  The modern form of commodities 
exchanges appeared in the American Midwest with the establishment of the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848. The commodities exchanges brought together 
farmers and merchants. Initially, the main task of the exchange was to standardise the 
quantities and qualities of grains that were traded, but within a few years, futures like 
contracts were being traded on the exchange. (Hull 2003) Soon after the introduction 
of futures contracts, speculators entered the market, trading in futures contracts in 
order to profit from price changes without the need to hold the physical commodity.  
 
Futures and many other derivative instruments have subsequently been developed for 
a wide range of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, and financial assets. 
These are traded on derivatives exchanges across the world.5  
 
Over time, the composition of these exchanges, according to trader type has also 
varied. The participants in any one commodities exchange include physical market 
traders who engage in futures trading for hedging purposes and speculators (both, 
physical and non-physical traders) who take a position on the direction of future 
movements on the price of the underlying asset. 
 
Whilst a proportion of derivatives trading have remained for the purposes of hedging 
by physical market traders, the share of derivatives trading taken up by financial 
                                                 
5
 Currently, the major futures exchanges are the CBOT, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the New 
York Mercantile Exchange, the New York Board of Trade, the International Petroleum Exchange, the 
London Metal Exchange and Le Marché à Terme International de France. 
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investors has increased throughout the period after the end of the Bretton Woods 
system. Since 2000, there has been a further explosion in trading activities on 
commodities exchanges that was initially triggered by the Dot com crisis which saw a 
shift of funds from equities to commodities.6 The value of outstanding OTC 
commodity derivatives in June 2007 was over 7.5 trillion US dollars, compared with 
0.77 trillion in 2002 and 0.44 trillion in 1998. (Bank for International Settlements 
2007) The growth in commodities has been sustained as new investors enter the 
markets, these include various institutional investors such as hedge funds and to lesser 
extent pension funds.7(Doyle, Hill et al. 2007)  Unlike hedge funds, pension funds 
have relatively long investment periods, 30 years for example, and can help sustain 
the level of investment in these markets over time. There has also been a growth in 
investment on commodity markets that has resulted from the lowering of entry 
barriers for smaller hedge funds with the transition from open outcry to electronic 
trading platforms that have taken place in many of the major commodities exchanges. 
Retail investment is also set to rise with an increase in the number of tradable 
products, such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), Exchange Traded notes (ETNs) 
and Exchange Traded Commodities (ETCs). (Doyle, Hill et al. 2007) 
 
With increasing financial activities in commodity markets that are already large 
compared with the size of physical production, the changing composition of exchange 
traders has affected market characteristics such as heightened price volatility as well 
as a dislocation between exchange prices and those warranted by supply and demand 
realities. (Domanski and Heath 2007; Doyle, Hill et al. 2007) 
 
Taking the specific example of arabica coffee, it is possible to measure the extent of 
speculation in commodity markets and see how this evolves over time. The New York 
Board of Trade (NYBOT) divides all trading members into two categories, hedgers 
and speculators. Hedgers are defined as entities that are trading on the exchange who 
                                                 
6
 Commodities represent an attractive asset class for investors since commodity prices move in line 
with inflation, commodities act as an inflation hedge.  More importantly, commodity prices display a 
negative correlation with the price of other financial instruments such as bonds and equities and 
therefore constitute a good asset class in terms of diversifying portfolios and risk reduction. It is 
therefore not surprising that commodity markets see increasing investment during periods of economic 
downturns. 
7
 In their 2007 FSA study, Doyle, Hill and Jack, found that75-80% of funds invested in the Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) are from pension funds. 
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are also engaged in physical commodity trade, these will include the large 
international commodity trading houses. All other exchange trading members are 
classified as speculators. This distinction is, however, not clear cut. It is not 
straightforward to determine what constitutes speculative behaviour since all 
derivatives trading, including for price risk management will contain elements of 
speculation which are only apparent ex-post. As the manager of a commodity 
derivatives division of an investment bank explained: 8 
 
Speculation is a bit of a dirty word in the city but in actual fact most of 
what anybody does has a form of speculation..….[A]ll of the trade houses 
to a greater or a lesser degree will involve in those types of decisions, 
whether to decide to delay a decision to hedge a purchase by 30 seconds, 
by an hour, by a day, by a week, or to delay a purchase or delay a sale, 
doesn’t really matter. So if you define that as speculation then there is a 
certain amount of it. 
 
In spite of the difficulties in separating speculative and hedging activities based upon 
the NYBOT categories, we can use this distinction in calculating a lower limit for 
speculative activity as a ratio of total trading activities using the ratio of NPCT open 
interest to total open interest. Figure 1. illustrates the evolution of this measure of 
speculation on coffee futures trading on the New York Exchange from 1986 until 
2007. For coffee futures, the ratio is volatile and NPCT trading activities have 
increased from between 10 and 30% of total open interest on the NY exchange in the 
1980s to a ratio that varies between 40 and 70% in the 2000s. This rise of fund 
activity in commodity derivatives and its implications for the market have not gone 
unmissed by the brokers themselves: 9 
 
[The Market] is as distorted as it has ever been, at least since 1997. 
There has been huge fund interest in recent years both in futures and 
in options. In options 30-40% of LIFFE is made up of funds and in 
NYBOT the figure is 60%.  
                                                 
8
 Quote  taken from an interview with a derivatives broker conducted by the present author in London, 
2007. 
9
 Quote  taken from an interview with a derivatives broker conducted by the present author in London, 
2007. 
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Figure 1 
 
5. Prices, price risk and risk management in Tanzanian and Ugandan coffee 
 chains  
 
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, prices on international commodity 
exchanges, including those for coffee, have become increasing volatile since the 
1970s. Price cycles have become more severe both in terms of their frequency and 
amplitude. 
 
Since the abandonment of various multilateral commodity price stabilisation schemes 
and compensatory finance facilities, participants in international commodity markets 
have had to seek new ways in which to react against and ameliorate the impact of 
heightened price volatility on world markets. 
 
There are a number of different strategies that coffee chain actors can adopt in order 
to manage the risk associated with international price movements. PRM strategies can 
be divided into those that manage exposure to risk, i.e. through the use of hedging 
instruments, and strategies that reduce the exposure to price fluctuations, such as fixed 
price forward contracts, back to back selling, entering niche markets, and 
diversification. Which of these strategies are adopted by chain actors has clear 
implications for the exposure to international price movements of chain actors 
immediately upstream (see Table 1). This in turn, affects the types of PRM strategies 
adopted by upstream actors. The potential for chain actors to profit from new financial 
avenues of accumulation depends upon their exposure to price volatilities and their 
ability to engage in hedging strategies. In contrast to belief of proponents of the 
universal use of hedging instruments by chain actors to manage price risks, the ability 
of individual chain actors to engage in various risk management strategies will 
heavily depend upon the organisation of the market at a particular segment of the 
chain, access to finance, information and brokerage services. 
 
Table 1 
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In the remainder of this section, an analysis of the relationship between price risk 
environment, price risk strategies, price transmission and the implications for the 
structure of the market and income distribution will be presented based upon the 
analytical categories in table 2. We look at the specific cases of coffee chains that 
originate in Tanzania and Uganda. The analysis is based upon a series of semi-
structured interviews, with various coffee chain stakeholders, conducted by the author 
between January and September 2007 in Switzerland, the UK, Tanzania and Uganda. 
 
 
5.1 The overall structure of international coffee markets 
 
Of all agricultural primary commodity markets, the international production, 
distribution and consumption system of coffee lends itself particularly well in terms of 
studying changes in the structure of the market along the supply chain. The primary 
commodity, green coffee, ends up at the consumption stage as a beverage in the main, 
taking relatively few forms compared with, for example, cotton, sugar or wheat. 
Coffee is predominantly produced in LICs, within tropical zones, but consumed in the 
main in high income countries in Europe and North America. The coffee supply 
system is thus, relatively uncomplicated and it is not difficult to trace the general 
movement of coffee from production to consumption.10,11  
 
Coffee production is fragmented across a large number of countries across the tropics. 
With the exception of Brazil, domestic consumption in producing countries is 
marginal. Figure 2 Shows the proportions of total world coffee exports from the 10 
largest coffee exporting countries. Coffee production and marketing systems vary 
considerably between producers. The major share of world coffee is produced by 
smallholders, although sizeable estate sectors exist in a number of coffee producing 
countries, particularly in Latin America. So as well as being geographically 
fragmented across the world, coffee production tends also to be fragmented within 
individual producing countries. Similarly, the marketing systems differ from country 
                                                 
10
 The coffee supply system is composed of individual, distinct, and interrelated commodity chains. 
11We are concerned with the bulk of coffee trade and refer here to commodity grades of coffee 
specified on the international exchanges. The speciality coffee market is quite different, and the 
processes of price formation are quite different in these markets. Specialty coffee is often compared 
with the market for fine wines in the industry (find a reference for this). 
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to country, with varying degrees of state intervention or centralised coordination of 
distribution. 
Figure 2 
 
Post export, the international coffee system becomes much more concentrated. Owing 
to the risky nature of international trade in coffee (and commodities in general) 
resulting from international price volatility, international traders have undergone 
considerable restructuring in the past two decades (Daviron and Ponte 2006). Prior to 
the 1970s, the size structure of the international coffee trading sector consisted of a 
larger number of small and medium sized  coffee only trading companies, together 
with a few larger diversified commodity trading companies. The trend has been 
towards the concentration of a few large coffee traders, many of which have merged 
with other commodity traders to become very large multinational commodity trading 
companies.12 In 1998, the two largest coffee traders (Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (NKG) 
and Volcafé) controlled 29% of total market share, and the top six companies 50% 
(Daviron and Ponte 2006). In 2006, Volcafe (now part of ED&F Man) and the NKG 
have maintained their dominant positions in the market, and control over 30% of 
world trade in green coffee. Concentration of the top 5 companies has also increased 
since 1998, and now accounts for a market share of over 55%. (Table 2) 
 
The final processing stage of coffee before coffee is in its consumption form, that is 
roasting and blending is also dominated by a small number of coffee roasting 
companies internationally. Table 3 shows the market shares of the top 5 coffee 
roasting and/or manufacturing companies, which together made up just below 50% of 
the world market. 
 
Table 2 
Table 3 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Volcafe, the leading coffee export company in the late 1990s, was purchased by the diversified 
commodity trading company  ED & F Man. Esteve, currently the third largest coffee trader in the world, 
was purchased by Cargill to form ECOM, in 2000. 
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5.2  The  structure of Tanzanian and Ugandan coffee marketing systems 
 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the pre-liberalisation coffee marketing systems in Tanzania and 
Uganda respectively. The pre-liberalisation marketing systems in both countries were 
centralised in the sense that all coffee exports went through a single channel, the 
Coffee Marketing Board in Uganda and the State run coffee auction in Tanzania. 
Coffee production in both countries is dominated by small-holder production although 
there was, and remains, a small estate sector in Tanzania. While in Tanzania all coffee 
was marketed through the cooperative marketing system, Uganda operated a dual 
local marketing system with both private and cooperative marketing channels in 
operation.  
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
 
The processes of domestic coffee market liberalisation, as well as the extent to which 
the markets were liberalised, differ between the two countries. The coffee market in 
Uganda was liberalised in 1990/1. The liberalisation process was rapid and Uganda 
remains the most fully liberalised coffee market in East Africa (Ponte 2001). The 
cooperative marketing channel for coffee has virtually disappeared and the vast 
majority of coffee is now marketed through private local traders. Figure 5 maps the 
Ugandan coffee marketing system following liberalisation. The coffee marketing 
board in Uganda became the Ugandan Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) in 
1991 with a statutory mandate to “promote and oversee the development of the coffee 
industry through research, quality assurance and improved marketing” (UCDA, 2007). 
The UCDA has no authority to set prices but does provide price information to market 
actors as well as an indicative price for dry cherry (kiboko). 
 
Figure 5 
 
The initial period following liberalisation saw a growth in the number of coffee export 
companies registered in Uganda, from 34 in 1992/3 to 117 at its peak in 1994/95. 
Since 1995 the number of registered export companies has been falling, year on year, 
and numbered 25 in the 2005/6 marketing season. The export sector is highly 
concentrated, with the top 5 companies making up over 70% of the market share, 
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compared with  52.2% in 1996/7 (Ponte 2001). Moreover, the top 5 companies are all 
subsidiaries of large MNC trading houses compared with just 2 in 1996/7 (Ponte 
2001). Local exporters have gradually been displaced from the top 10 exporting firms, 
and the sector in general. In 1996/7, 70 of the top 10 exporters were local, compared 
with 4 in 1998/99 and just 3 in 2005/6 (Table 4). Coffee production in Uganda is 
dominated by small holder production. This is geographically dispersed across several 
regions. There are two coffee seasons per year in each region and the time of the 
seasons vary between the regions north and south of the equator.13 
 
Table 4 
 
Owing to the variations in coffee seasons across the country, export companies are all 
based in Kampala and rely upon local traders to bring the coffee from farm-gate to 
factory gate. Local traders purchase dry cherry (kiboko) from farmers and mill it into 
what is known as fair and average quality (FAQ) coffee, this is green coffee that has 
not been sorted according to the size and shape of the bean. Exporters purchase FAQ 
coffee which is cleaned and graded, according to bean size and the number of defects, 
before it is ready for export. 
 
 
The liberalisation process in Tanzania began in 1994/5 and has not been as complete 
as in Uganda. Tanzania has maintained its auction system. The cooperative sector 
remains relatively strong in the Northern coffee growing regions of Kilimanjaro and 
Kagera. Figures 6 and 7 depict the coffee marketing system in Tanzania since 
liberalisation in 1994/5. In 2003 there were further changes in the coffee marketing 
system with the introduction of direct export and the one licence law that prevented 
any single market actor to simultaneously purchase coffee locally and at the auction. 
14
  
                                                 
13
 During the months of January to April the drugar (Arabica) crop is harvested in Kasese, Paidha, 
Kapchorwa and Mbale. The robusta harvest takes place in Masaka, Mbarara, Bushenyi, Sembabule and 
Kalangala from May until August, and in the central regions of Buboga, Kiboga, Kayunga, Mubende, 
Mukuno, Wakiso and Mpigi from September to December.  
14
 Arabical coffee is grown in the Kilimanjaro highlands while Kagera is the only robusta growing 
region in Tanzania. The one licence rule was introduced in order to eliminate, so called, captive coffee 
that was sold and re-purchased by the same market actor (Temu, Winter-Nelson et al. 2001) Prior to the 
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Figure 6 
Figure 7 
 
 
In contrast with the Ugandan coffee system, private exporters were operating in the 
Tanzanian coffee marketing system prior to liberalisation although the vast majority 
of green coffee was exported by the cooperative unions. In 1994/5 83% of coffee 
exports were exported by the Cooperative union sector (Ponte 2001). This share fell to 
26% in 1999/00 with the collapse of a number of CUs, in particular those in the 
Southern coffee regions (Ponte 2001). In 2006/7, the export share of the three 
remaining CUs stood at 8.76%.  
 
Similar to Uganda, the coffee export sector in Tanzania is highly concentrated, with 
the levels of concentration having increased steadily since liberalisation. In 1994/5 the 
market shares of the top 5 exporters, in terms of market share, was 59.5%, this stood 
at 63.7% in 1999/00 and was 67.7% in 2006/7. The number of active export 
companies in Tanzania has remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 22 and 27, 
between 1994/5 and 2002/3. With the introduction of direct export licenses, the 
number of registered exporters has increased, although the number of exporters 
operating in the auction system remains at similar numbers to the pre 2003 levels. The 
dominance of foreign owned MNC exporters in the sector has also increased. In 
1994/5 3 of the top 5 exporters were locally owned compared with 1 in 1999/00 
(Ponte 2001). By 2006/7 the top 5 coffee exporters were all subsidiaries of large 
MNC trading houses.  
Table 5 
 
 
5.3 Price risks and price risk management at the international trader level:  
implications on price transmission, income distribution and market 
structure 
 
                                                                                                                                            
issuing of direct export licences, all coffee had to pass through the auction in order to be exported. 
Only owners of specialty coffees that can fetch premium prices could apply for direct export licences. 
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As a matter of course, the largest of the trade houses hedge all green coffee trades. E 
D & F Man and the Neumann Kaffee Gruppe have their own in-house options and 
futures brokerages in E D & F Man Commodity Advisors Limited and TRX Futures, 
respectively. In addition, both trading houses have large coffee research departments, 
based in London in the same buildings as their brokerages. 15 
 
The size and financial muscle of the dominant firms, together with their 
diversification across a number of commodities has allowed these firms to weather the 
increasingly volatile environment of international commodity markets. Smaller single 
commodity trading firms have either been forced out of the market or have entered 
into niche markets, trading in specialty coffees where prices are less volatile. 16 
 
The large commodity trading companies seek to derive part of their income through 
speculative activities. When asked whether they ever engage in derivatives trading for 
purposes other than pure hedging, the risk manager of a large international 
commodity trading company responded with, “Once in a while we take a speculative 
position….[It occurs] basically daily. You’re never fully hedged up so part of your 
position could always be regarded as speculative.” 17 More than just a PRM-strategy, 
the exploitation of price variations by physical traders on derivatives markets has 
become part of day to day business and the generation of income.   
Increasingly, physical traders are including the behaviour of financial actors on 
derivatives markets with information on physical supply and demand as part of the 
fundamental make up of commodity markets. Price movements that are exacerbated 
by financial actors themselves, provide opportunities for physical traders to derive 
profit: 18 
 
                                                 
15
 E D & F Man Coffee & Cocoa Research, and NKG Statistical Unit Ltd. 
16
 Another contributing factor to the concentration of the market at the international trader level has 
been due to improvements in communications technology, together with liberalised markets, that have 
led to greater price transparency along certain segments of the commodity chain. This has acted to 
erode the margins once enjoyed by international trading companies. Thus, firm size has become 
important in order to secure adequate trading volumes.  
17
 Quote taken from an interview with the manager of an international coffee trading company 
conducted by the author  in Kampala, Uganda, 2007 . 
18
 Quoted from a telephone interview  with a commodities trader based in the US, conducted by the 
author in 2007. 
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“there are some very savvy physical traders that know exactly what the 
speculators do, how they think and what they’ll do next and they play the 
game, definitely. They make it part of their own game”  
 
This process has acted to reinforce the concentration of international traders in the 
bulk market for coffee. The coffee trade has been effectively separated into two 
markets where smaller firms survive on the basis of more traditional avenues of 
accumulation by trading in specialty coffees, where the pricing process, to a large 
extent, takes place away from the movement of prices on the New York and London 
markets. 
 
In the bulk trade, the move from fixed price forward contracts that were the norm 
before the 1970s to price to be fixed forward contracts has serious implications on the 
exposure faced by upstream actors to price fluctuations originating from the 
international commodity exchanges. 
 
 
5.4 Price risks and price risk management in producer countries: an  
  examination of Tanzanian and Ugandan coffee chains. 
 
Under cooperative marketing systems price risk was managed centrally and shared 
out amongst producers to allow individual producers to earn a stable income. In 
Uganda, both cooperatives and private local traders purchased at fixed producer prices 
and fixed margins (Ponte 2001), international price fluctuations were not transmitted 
to local actors in the Ugandan coffee marketing system but managed through the 
central marketing board.  
 
In terms of exposure to international price volatility, prior to 1989, the International 
Coffee Agreement, ensured relatively stable export prices that translated to relatively 
stable farm-gate prices in both Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanzania, ownership of the 
coffee remained with individual small holder farmers and estates, through the 
cooperatives, up to the point of auction. This meant that farmers carried the risk of 
price fluctuations in the period between initial marketing and auction. Farmers’ 
incomes were, however, smoothed throughout the selling season since the payment 
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system entailed an initial fixed payment for coffee deposited at the village level 
primary societies, with second payments of the difference from the auction price 
following export.   In this system, price risk was managed centrally and shared out 
amongst producers to allow individual producers to earn a stable income. In Uganda, 
both cooperatives and private local traders purchased at fixed producer prices and 
fixed margins (Ponte 2001), international price fluctuations were not transmitted to 
local actors in the Ugandan coffee marketing system but managed through the central 
marketing board. 
 
Since the mid 1990s, price risk, risk management and their consequences have 
differed between Tanzania and Uganda owing to the differences in the liberalisation 
processes of domestic coffee markets. Within each coffee producing country, the 
experiences of different coffee chain actors depend upon the structure of the 
marketing chain with which they are engaged as well as their position along it. 
 
Since liberalisation, there has been a greater transmission of international coffee 
prices to local prices at each segment of the chain (Baffes and Ajwad 2001; 
Fafchamps, Hill et al. 2003). However, the transmission of long-run and short-run 
price variations have not been uniformly transmitted along all segments of the 
marketing system. Taking the private marketing system as an example, we look at the 
relationship between price volatility, PRM strategies and the processes of 
accumulation along the three related, private marketing chains in Uganda (figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 
 
Both local and international export companies face the risk associated with world 
price volatility of coffee coming from the international exchanges in New York and 
London. The PRM strategies adopted by the two types of exporters differ 
considerably. International exporters tend to sell the majority of their coffee on a price 
to be fixed basis. All coffee transactions are hedged on NYBOT of Liffe, through 
their principle offices in Europe, and Singapore in the case of Olam. Orders for the 
purchase of futures and options come from the Kampala office and the timing of when 
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to place an order can depend upon the exporter taking a position on how he expects 
prices on New York or London to evolve: 19 
 
[W]e always take a position, putting into consideration what we expect to 
buy. It’s not just a corrective move, but we know what we are buying and 
we hedge it.  
 
The decision to hedge, as a PRM strategy therefore also contains a speculative 
element. By taking a position on the market, accumulation along new financial 
avenues is possible for this group of market actors. It might be expected that short-
term price movements are transmitted upstream from international exporters. This is 
however not the case in practice. International exporters will themselves cushion the 
short-term volatility to some extent  to make the procurement of coffee practical in the 
Ugandan context. They will maintain purchasing prices throughout a day and for 
longer periods if world price fluctuations are not too severe: 20 
 
[We] try and cushion the volatility when it gets to the farm level. So we 
try to make a price for a longer time period, and that again depends on the 
market view and when during the day, and when during the week, we 
want to hedge coffee. We take advice from [our derivatives broker….. we 
take responsibility of getting the hedging wrong. If we get it right we get a 
bit more money, but we can hold a price at farm level for about 3 or 4 
days. I guess if you’re saying that volatility has increased…in the past we 
might have done that for a week, 10 days.  
 
By contrast local exporters do not use futures and options in their PRM strategies 
owing to relatively small export volumes at any one time compared with the lot sizes 
in New York and London and their limited access to the necessary finance to engage 
in derivatives trading activities.21 Local exporters use a combination of PRM 
strategies that limit their exposure to international price fluctuations, namely by 
                                                 
19
 Quote from interview of the manager of an international trading company in Kampala conducted by 
the author in 2007. 
20
 Quote from interview with a coffee trader from an international trading company in Kampala 
conducted by the author in 2007. 
21
 Local traders do not engage in hedging on derivatives markets in spite of their understanding of the 
principles of these hedging instruments. 
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utilising forward contracts for a portion of expected sales and back to back selling. By 
limiting their exposure, local exporters also limit the potential to earn rents derived 
from changes in international prices. The use of forward contracts for export acts as a 
price buffer for actors upstream of the chain, mediating their exposure to international 
price fluctuations. 
 
Local traders are to some extent shielded from very short-term fluctuations in world 
prices. They are however, still exposed to inter-day or weekly swings in the 
purchasing price of exporters in Kampala. Local traders buy and sell coffee on the 
spot. They have no access to contractual arrangements that can limit their exposure to 
short-term price movements. Local traders try to ensure large margins that can contain 
the price volatility.  They will purchase kiboko at stable but low prices from 
producers to ensure a margin,22  
 
[The strategy that maybe we use is, at least go to the ground, try to 
procure coffee at a fair price for any eventuality, especially when it goes 
down. At least if you have procured it at the sort of farm level, at that sort 
of level, you buy it at a bit fair price…Not very expensive. So if it goes 
down, at least you don’t lose a lot of money….we cannot sell all the time 
at x100%, as I told you, you can have some 10 or 20% [margin]…we keep 
[for price] exposure 20%. 
 
[Local traders] don’t have any strategies. Occasionally they get caught up. 
They will buy here [indicating a high price] and by the time they are 
selling the prices are here [indicating a lower price]……one of the 
strategies that they take, they try to cheat the farmers on the 
weights…..Otherwise, some of them, if they really get caught up then they 
will try to cheat the exporter. They try to mix in some stones, dust, non-
coffee material, to cover some of these loses. So whenever the prices drop, 
we are very strict, we are very careful.” 
 
                                                 
22
 Quotes taken  from interviews with a local coffee trader and the manager of an international coffee 
export company conducted in Kampala, by the author in 2007. 
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Short-run price changes are thus not transmitted directly to producers but are manifest 
in low farm-gate prices. At the same time, coffee production in Uganda has been 
falling since 1997 despite increasing world coffee prices (figure 9). 23 
 
Figure 9 
 
The crisis of coffee production in Uganda is also reflected in the efforts of the 
Ugandan Coffee Development Authority (UCDA), NGOs such as NUCAFE, and a 
number of International exporters to promote production through the organisation of 
farmers and improved farming practices, for example, the NKG Small holder scheme 
and EDE consulting.   
 
 
In order to compare differences in relationships between the exposure to price 
volatility, PRM strategies and accumulation processes of chain actors in the 
Tanzanian and Ugandan coffee marketing systems we take the example of the 
cooperative marketing channels. Chain A in figure 10 depicts a traditional cooperative 
marketing chain with small holder producers organised into primary societies at the 
village level, which are in turn organised into a regional cooperative union. Decision 
making is democratic amongst the members at the annual general meeting and 
information on prices and production is collated at the union level and disseminated to 
farmers through the primary societies. After liberalisation a number of farmers, and 
groups of farmers, unhappy with the costs and perceived inefficiencies of the 
cooperative unions decided to leave the unions in order to earn larger margins by 
marketing their own coffee. Some of these farmers groups utilised the marketing 
structure of the cooperatives and formed farmers’ group alliances.24  
 
Figure 10 
 
                                                 
23
 The fall in coffee production from 2000 can in part be explained by the period of low world prices 
1999-2001. Coffee prices recovered in 2002, but production has continued to decline through to 2006. 
24
 Examples of relatively successful farmers group alliances are the G32 in Kilimanjaro region, made 
up of a collection of 32 newly formed farmers groups and former primary societies of the Kilimanjaro 
Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), and Kilicafé. Both the KNCU and the G32 have accounts and 
overdraft facilities at the Kilimanjaro Cooperative Bank, where a warehouse receipt system is in 
operations. 
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As in the Ugandan case, exporters in Tanzania are fully exposed to short-term 
movements in world coffee prices. International traders utilise the standard, price to 
be fixed contracts for sales, and hedge 100% of all coffee transactions through their 
principal offices. Cooperative Unions can also act as exporters, purchasing the coffee 
from the auction for export. None of the three CUs currently operating in the coffee 
market are using hedging instruments to manage risks associated with world market 
fluctuations, preferring to secure stable prices at premiums through participation in 
niche and specialty markets, most notably the fair-trade scheme. The KNCU, Kagera 
Cooperative Union (KCU) and Kilicafe are all registered as suppliers of fair-trade 
coffee. As exporters, KNCU and KCU tend to sell on forward contracts and some 
back to back sales in order to limit their exposure to price fluctuations. Kilicafe is 
currently the only farmers’ organisation that has used options as a risk management 
strategy, but only a portion of coffee transactions are hedged in this way. 
 
World coffee prices are transmitted through the auction to local marketing actors, but 
very short-term movements are mitigated by the fact that the auction takes place once 
a week during the selling season. Unlike the private coffee marketing chains in 
Uganda, green coffee remains the property of individual farmers until the auction. 
Farmers therefore bare the entirety of the risk associated with price variability 
transmitted through the auction. The payment system of the pre-liberalisation 
cooperative system remains in these three marketing chains and individual farmers 
incomes are smoothed with a fixed initial payment on deposit of parchment coffee 
followed by the differences earned by coffee from each primary society.25 Weekly 
price fluctuations are therefore shared out amongst individuals belonging to a primary 
society and farmers. There is therefore more real accumulation taking place along the 
cooperative marketing chains in Kilimanjaro region, Tanzania, compared with the 
Uganda. Despite the efforts of the World Bank Commodity Risk Management Group, 
together with the CRDB bank of Tanzania, to promote the use of hedging instruments 
by cooperatives and farmers groups26, with the exception of Kilicafe, no farmers 
                                                 
25
 Parchment refers to coffee that has been pulped to remove the fruit but with the husk still intact. 
26
 The World Bank Commodity Risk Management Group recently funded a project conducted through 
the CRDB bank to make available hedging instruments, namely New York futures contracts, that were 
brokered by a  third party in the US, via the CRDB bank. These hedging instruments were pitched to 
coffee market actors as “Kinga ya bei”, or price insurance. 
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groups or cooperative unions are using hedging instruments. 27 Furthermore, the 
instruments offered by CRDB bank do not provide the potential for Tanzanian market 
actors to derive income from upswings in prices, but merely to protect them from 
downswings.  
Figure 11 
Figure 12 
 
Coffee production in Tanzania has also been falling during the period of increasing 
world prices. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper has proposed and applied an analytical approach to the study of particular 
relationships derivatives and physical markets for coffee and some of the broad 
implications these have on production and marketing systems the collapse of the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICoA) and the liberalisation of coffee markets in 
Tanzania and Uganda. It has been argued that the rise in speculative activities by non-
physical commodity trading actors on futures markets have contributed to an increase 
in price volatility on international commodity exchanges. This increased price 
volatility on futures markets has been increasingly transmitted to the physical markets 
since the collapse of the ICoA owing to shift PRM strategies, at the international 
trader level, towards a reliance on hedging instruments together with price to be fixed 
contracts. 
 
It has been shown, with the examples of Tanzanian and Ugandan coffee chains that 
the new volatile environment at the world level, is not transmitted evenly along coffee 
chains, but depends upon the structure and organisation of local supply systems in 
origin countries.  In the context of heterogeneous chain actors, the new volatile 
environment offers either opportunities or challenges to participants within coffee 
chains. New financial avenues for accumulation have been opened for the largest, 
most diversified, trading firms with access to financial resources, whilst presenting 
insurmountable challenges to small coffee trading firms engaged in the bulk trade. 
                                                 
27
 Kilicafé purchase options through a US brokerage rather than through CRDB bank. 
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This has led to an increase concentration of trading firms at the international level. 
Similar outcomes, in terms of market structure, are observed at the export level in 
Tanzania and Uganda, where firms that engage in derivatives trading are dominant. 
Local exporters that are excluded from using hedging instruments have suffered a 
declining market share since the period immediately following liberalisation. 
 
Upstream coffee chain actors experience levels of price volatility that depend upon 
the PRM-strategies adopted by downstream actors, as well as the organisation of 
production and marketing. In Uganda, private local traders dominate the local 
marketing segment of the chain. In absorbing the price volatility they experience with 
large marketing margins, individual, unorganised farmers have experienced low, but 
stable, prices for kiboko. The cooperative marketing system in Tanzania has allowed 
the incomes derived from coffee production to be stabilised across farmers within a 
season. These marketing practices, however effectively prevent local chain actors 
from deriving income through financial avenues.  
 
Coffee chain actors face new imperatives in the light of the long-run reduction in 
coffee prices, and increasingly volatile prices. To be competitive at the international 
trade level, firms’ imperatives become increasingly aligned with financial speculators 
in seeking to derive incomes through the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities and 
increasing bidding on derivatives markets that is sustained by new entrants in the 
market, as opposed to the traditional type of competition amongst physical traders that 
tend to drive prices down with increasing market participants. (Knafo 2007) 
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Figure 1. Ratio of non-commercial open interest to total open interest in coffee C 
contracts on  the New York Coffee Exchange. 
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Price risk 
management strategy 
Mechanism of price 
risk management 
Implications for 
upstream chain 
actors exposure to 
international price 
fluctuations  
Implications on the 
accumulation process  
Price to be fixed 
contracts together 
with 
hedging on 
derivatives markets 
Based on full exposure 
to price fluctuations 
and the offsetting of the 
risk through the 
purchase or sale of 
futures or options. 
Price fluctuations are 
passed upstream along 
the chain 
Possibility of earning 
financial rents 
associated with 
activities on derivatives 
markets. 
Forward contracts Transaction price set 
ahead of delivery date 
to reduce exposure to 
international price 
fluctuations 
The transmission of 
price volatility upstream 
along the chain is 
limited by the forward 
contract 
No possibility of earning 
financial rents 
associated with 
activities on derivatives 
markets. 
Income is derived along 
traditional avenues.  
Back to back selling Sell as rapidly as 
possible after 
purchasing coffee to 
limit the time period of 
the exposure to price 
fluctuations 
Price fluctuations are 
passed upstream along 
the chain 
No possibility of earning 
financial rents 
associated with 
activities on derivatives 
markets. 
Small and unstable 
margins earned along 
traditional avenues. 
Fairtrade, specialty 
and niche markets 
Market a differentiated 
product that does not 
depend as much on 
price movements on 
the futures market. 
Limits price volatility 
upstream. 
No possibility of earning 
financial rents 
associated with 
activities on derivatives 
markets. 
Small but stable 
margins earned along 
traditional avenues. 
Diversification Limit the reliance on 
income derived from 
any single product that 
may exhibit volatile 
prices 
Price fluctuations are 
passed upstream along 
the chain 
No possibility of earning 
financial rents 
associated with 
activities on derivatives 
markets 
  
Table 2.   Types of price risk management strategies adopted by commodity chain actors, 
and their  consequences on price exposure and income derivation  
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Brazil
30%
Vietnam
19%
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12%
Indonesia
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Guatemala
4%
Honduras
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Rest of World
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Figure 2  Proportion of total exports of green coffee from the top 10 coffee exporting 
countries in 2007. Data Source: ICO 2008 
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Trading 
Company 
millions of 60 kg 
bags traded 
estimated share of 
the world market 
cumulative share 
of world market 
Volcafe 
(ED&F Man) 
15.6 17.83% 17.83% 
Neumann 
 
12 13.72% 31.55% 
Esteve 
(Ecom) 
9.5 10.86% 42.40% 
Olam† 
 
5.5 6.29% 48.69% 
Noble* 
 
5 5.71% 54.41% 
†Olam is a diversified commodity trading company registered in Singapore. 
*Noble is a Hong Kong based company and is Asia’s largest diversified commodities trading company. 
Table 2  Market shares of the 5 top trading companies for green coffee in 2006 (data 
source: ED&F Man Coffee Division, 2007 and ICO, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coffee Roaster/ 
Manufacturer 
millions of 60 kg 
bags traded  
estimated share 
of the world 
market 
cumulative share 
of world market 
Nestle 12.8 14.63% 14.63% 
Kraft 11.8 13.49% 28.12% 
Sara Lee 8 9.14% 37.26% 
Folger 4.8 5.49% 42.75% 
Tchibo 3.1 3.54% 46.29% 
Table 3.  Market shares of the 5 top coffee roasting and/or manyfacturing groups in 2006 
(data source: ED&F Man Coffee Division, 2007 and ICO, 2006) 
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Figure 3. Ugandan coffee marketing system prior to liberalisation in 1990/1 
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Figure 4. Tanzanian coffee marketing system prior to liberalisation in 1994/5 
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* UNEX refers to Union Export Services Ltd, the first company  
that was issued with a licence to export in the period immediately 
following liberalisation. 
Figure 5. Ugandan coffee marketing system after liberalisation 
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% Market Share EXPORTER 
Individual  Cumulative 
Type of company  
 
GRAND TOTAL 100.0 2,002,324  
1 Kyagalanyi Coffee Ltd. 17.50  17.50  Subsidiary of coffee division of 
a lar 
ge diversified commodity 
trading MNC.* 
2 Kawacom (U) Ltd. 14.83  32.33  Subsidiary of a coffee trading 
MNC 
3 Pan Afric Impex Ltd. 14.77   47.09  Ugandan office of a Sudanese, 
regional coffee trading and 
transportation company, 
supplying the Sudanese 
market in the main.    
4 Ugacof Ltd.  . 13.10  60.19  Foreign owned coffee trading 
company 
5 Great Lakes 9.86  70.05  Foreign owned coffee trading 
company 
6 Olam (U) Ltd 8.89  78.94  Ugandan office of vertically 
integrated diversified 
commodity trading MNC † 
7 Ibero (U) Ltd. 5.55  84.50  Subsidiary of a large coffee 
trading MNC‡ 
8 Job Coffee 3.03   87.53  Local export company  
9 Lake Land Holding Ltd. 1.85   89.38  Local export company   
10 Nakana Coffee Factory  1.80  91.17  Local export company 
* Kyagalanyi Coffee Ltd  is a subsidiary of Volcafe, part of the group ED&F Man, is the second largest 
coffee trader in the world 
†Olam is a diversified commodity MNC, based in Singapore. 
‡Ibero is part of the Neumann Kaffee Gruppe, the worlds largest trader of coffee. 
 
Table 4.  Market shares of the top 10 coffee exporters in Uganda - Oct/Sept 2005/06 
(adapted  from UCDA annual report, 2005/6) 
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Figure 6 Tanzanian coffee marketing system between 1994/5 and 2003 
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Figure 7  Tanzanian coffee marketing system since 2003 
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Table 5 Market shares of the top 10 coffee exporters in Tanzania –Oct/Sep 2005/06 
(Data source: TCB 2007) 
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Figure 8  Private coffee marketing chains in Uganda 
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Figure 9  Annual coffee production in Uganda 1977-2006 (Data Source: ICO 2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 10  Cooperative coffee marketing chains in Tanzania 
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Figure 11. Annual production of arabica coffee in Kilimanjaro region, Tanzania, since 
liberalisation in 1994/5 (Data source: Tanzania Coffee Board, 2007) 
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Figure 12. Annual coffee production in Tanzania 1977-2006 (Data Source: ICO 2007) 
 
 
